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The Decline of Traditional
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Franklin R. Edwards and Frederic S. Mishkin 1
he traditional banking business has been to
make long-term loans and fund them by issu-
ing short-dated deposits, a process that is
commonly described as “borrowing short and
lending long.” In recent years, fundamental economic
forces have undercut the traditional role of banks in ﬁnan-
cial intermediation. As a source of funds for ﬁnancial inter-
mediaries, deposits have steadily diminished in importance.
In addition, the proﬁtability of traditional banking activi-
ties such as business lending has diminished in recent
years. As a result, banks have increasingly turned to new,
nontraditional ﬁnancial activities as a way of maintaining
their position as ﬁnancial intermediaries.2
This article has two objectives: to examine the
forces responsible for the declining role of traditional
banking in the United States as well as in other countries,
and to explore the implications of this decline and banks’
responses to it for ﬁnancial stability and regulatory pol-
icy. A key policy issue is whether the decline of banking
threatens to make the ﬁnancial system more fragile. If
nothing else, the prospect of a mass exodus from the
banking industry (possibly via increased failures) could
cause instability in the ﬁnancial system. Of greater con-
cern is that declining proﬁtability could tip the incen-
tives of bank managers toward assuming greater risk in
an effort to maintain former proﬁt levels. For example,
banks might make loans to less creditworthy borrowers or
engage in nontraditional ﬁnancial activities that promise
higher returns but carry greater risk. A new activity that
has generated particular concern recently is the expand-
ing role of banks as dealers in derivatives products. There
is a fear that in seeking new sources of revenue in deriva-
tives, banks may be taking risks that could ultimately
undermine their solvency and possibly the stability of the
banking system.
The challenge posed by the decline of traditional
banking is twofold: we need to maintain the soundness of
the banking system while restructuring the banking indus-
try to achieve long-term ﬁnancial stability. A sound regula-
tory policy can encourage an orderly shrinkage of
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traditional banking while strengthening the competitive
position of banks, possibly by allowing them to expand
into more proﬁtable, nontraditional activities. In the tran-
sitional period, of course, regulators would have to con-
tinue to guard against excessive risk taking that could
threaten ﬁnancial stability.
The ﬁrst part of our article documents the declin-
ing ﬁnancial intermediation role of traditional banks in
the United States. We discuss the economic forces driving
this decline, in both the United States and foreign coun-
tries, and describe how banks have responded to these
pressures. Included in this discussion is an examina-
tion of banks’ activities in derivatives markets, a par-
ticularly fast-growing area of their off-balance-sheet
activities. Finally, we examine the implications of the
changing nature of banking for ﬁnancial fragility and
regulatory policy.
THE DECLINE OF TRADITIONAL BANKING
IN THE UNITED STATES
In the United States, the importance of commercial banks
as a source of funds to nonﬁnancial borrowers has shrunk
dramatically. In l974 banks provided 35 percent of these
funds; today they provide around 22 percent (Chart 1).
Thrift institutions (savings and loans, mutual savings
banks, and credit unions), which can be viewed as special-
ized banking institutions, have also suffered a decline in
market share, from more than 20 percent in the late 1970s
to below 10 percent in the 1990s (Chart 2).
Another way of viewing the declining role of
banking in traditional ﬁnancial intermediation is to look at
the size of banks’ balance-sheet assets relative to those of
other ﬁnancial intermediaries (Table 1). Commercial banks’
share of total ﬁnancial intermediary assets fell from around
the 40 percent range in the 1960-80 period to below
30 percent by the end of 1994. Similarly, the share of total
ﬁnancial intermediary assets held by thrift institutions
In the United States, the importance of
commercial banks as a source of funds to
nonﬁnancial borrowers has shrunk
dramatically. In l974 banks provided
35 percent of these funds; today they
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declined from around 20 percent in the 1960-80 period to
below 10 percent by 1994.3
Boyd and Gertler (1994) and Kaufman and Mote
(1994) correctly point out that the decline in the share of
total ﬁnancial intermediary assets held by banking institu-
tions does not necessarily indicate that the banking indus-
try is in decline. Because banks have been increasing their
off-balance-sheet activities (an issue we discuss below), we
may understate their role in ﬁnancial markets if we look
solely at the on-balance-sheet activities. However, the
decline in traditional banking, which is reﬂected in the
decline in banks’ share of total ﬁnancial intermediary
assets, raises important policy issues that are the focus of
this article.
There is also evidence of an erosion in traditional
banking proﬁtability. Nevertheless, standard measures of
commercial bank proﬁtability such as pretax rates of
return on assets and equity (shown in Chart 3) do not pro-
vide a clear picture of the trend in bank proﬁtability.
Although banks’ before-tax rate of return on equity
declined from an average of 15 percent in the 1970-84
period to below 12 percent in the 1985-91 period, bank
proﬁts improved sharply beginning in 1992, and 1994
was a record year for bank proﬁts.
Overall bank proﬁtability, however, is not a good
indicator of the proﬁtability of traditional banking because
it includes the increasingly important nontraditional busi-
nesses of banks. As a share of total bank income, noninter-
est income derived from off-balance-sheet activities, such
as fee and trading income, averaged 19 percent in the
1960-80 period (Chart 4). By 1994, this source of income
had grown to about 35 percent of total bank income.
Although some of this growth in fee and trading income
may be attributable to an expansion of traditional fee activ-
ities, much of it is not.
A crude measure of the proﬁtability of the tradi-
tional banking business is to exclude noninterest income
from total earnings, since much of this income comes from
nontraditional activities. By this measure, the pretax return
on equity fell from more than 10 percent in 1960 to levels
that approached negative 10 percent in the late 1980s and
early 1990s (Chart 5). This measure, however, does not
adjust for the expenses associated with generating nonin-
Source:  Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds
Accounts.
Table 1
RELATIVE SHARES OF TOTAL FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARY
ASSETS, 1960-94
Percent
1960 1970 1980 1990 1994
Insurance companies
Life insurance 19.6 15.3 11.5 12.5 13.0
Property and casualty 4.4 3.8 4.5 4.9 4.6
Pension funds
Private 6.4 8.4 12.5 14.9 16.2
Public (state and local
  government) 3.3 4.6 4.9 6.7 8.4
Finance companies 4.7 4.9 5.1 5.6 5.3
Mutual funds
Stock and bond 2.9 3.6 1.7 5.9 10.8
Money market 0.0 0.0 1.9 4.6 4.2
Depository institutions (banks)
Commercial banks 38.6 38.5 37.2 30.4 28.6
Savings and loans and
  mutual savings 19.0 19.4 19.6 12.5 7.0
Credit unions 1.1 1.4 1.6 2.0 2.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0































Scale30 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JULY 1995
terest income and therefore overstates the decline in the
proﬁtability of traditional banking. Another indicator of
the decline in the proﬁtability of traditional banking is the
fall in the ratio of market value to book value of bank capi-
tal from the mid-1960s to the early 1980s. As noted by
Keeley (1990), this fall indicates that bank charters were
becoming less valuable in this period (Chart 6). The
decline in the value of bank charters in the years preceding
the sharp increase in nontraditional activities supports the
view that there was a substantial decline in the proﬁtability
of traditional banking. Only with the rise in nontraditional
activities that begins in the early 1980s (Chart 4) does the
market value of banks begin to rise.
WHY IS TRADITIONAL BANKING
IN DECLINE?
Fundamental economic forces have led to ﬁnancial innova-
tions that have increased competition in ﬁnancial markets.
Greater competition in turn has diminished the cost
advantage banks have had in acquiring funds and has
undercut their position in loan markets. As a result, tradi-
tional banking has lost proﬁtability, and banks have begun
to diversify into new activities that bring higher returns.
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DIMINISHED ADVANTAGE IN ACQUIRING FUNDS
(LIABILITIES)
Until 1980, deposits were a cheap source of funds for U.S.
banking institutions (commercial banks, savings and loans,
mutual savings banks, and credit unions). Deposit rate
ceilings prevented banks from paying interest on checkable
deposits, and Regulation Q limited them to paying speci-
ﬁed interest rate ceilings on savings and time deposits. For
many years, these restrictions worked to the advantage of
banks because a major source of bank funds was checkable
deposits (in l960 and earlier years, these deposits consti-
tuted more than 60 percent of total bank deposits). The
zero interest cost on these deposits resulted in banks hav-
ing a low average cost of funds.
This cost advantage did not last. The rise in inﬂa-
tion beginning in the late 1960s led to higher interest
rates and made investors more sensitive to yield differen-
tials on different assets. The result was the so-called disin-
termediation process, in which depositors took their
money out of banks paying low interest rates on both
checkable and time deposits and purchased higher yield-
ing assets. In addition, restrictive bank regulations cre-
ated an opportunity for nonbank ﬁnancial institutions to
invent new ways to offer bank depositors higher rates.
Nonbank competitors were not subject to deposit rate
ceilings and did not have the costs associated with having
to hold non-interest-bearing reserves and paying deposit
insurance premiums. A key development was the creation
of money market mutual funds, which put banks at a
competitive disadvantage because money market mutual
fund shareholders (or depositors) could obtain check-
writing services while earning a higher interest rate on
their funds. Not surprisingly, as a source of funds for
banks, low-cost checkable deposits declined dramatically,
falling from 60 percent of bank liabilities in l960 to under
20 percent today.
The growing disadvantage of banks in raising
funds led to their supporting legislation in the 1980s to
eliminate Regulation Q ceilings on time deposits and to
allow checkable deposits that paid interest (NOW
accounts). Although the ensuing changes helped to make
banks more competitive in their quest for funds, the banks’
cost of funds rose substantially, reducing the cost advan-
tage they enjoyed.
DIMINISHED INCOME (OR LOAN) ADVANTAGES
Banks have also experienced a deterioration in the income
advantages they once enjoyed on the asset side of their bal-
ance sheets. The growth of the commercial paper and junk
bond markets and the increased securitization of assets
have undercut banks’ traditional advantage in providing
credit.
Improvements in information technology, which
have made it easier for households, corporations, and ﬁnan-
cial institutions to evaluate the quality of securities, have
made it easier for business ﬁrms to borrow directly from
the public by issuing securities. In particular, instead of
going to banks to ﬁnance short-term credit needs, many
business customers now borrow through the commercial
paper market. Total nonﬁnancial commercial paper out-
standing as a percentage of commercial and industrial bank
loans has risen from 5 percent in l970 to more than 20 per-
cent today.
The rise of money market mutual funds has also
indirectly undercut banks by supporting the expansion of
competing ﬁnance companies. The growth of assets in
money market mutual funds to more than $500 billion
created a ready market for commercial paper because
money market mutual funds must hold liquid, high-
quality, short-term assets.   Further, the growth in the
commercial paper market has enabled ﬁnance companies,
which depend on issuing commercial paper for much of
their funding, to expand their lending at the expense of
banks. Finance companies provide credit to many of the
same businesses that banks have traditionally served. In
1980, ﬁnance company loans to businesses amounted to
about 30 percent of banks’ commercial and industrial
loans; today these loans constitute more than 60 percent of
banks’ commercial and industrial loans.
The junk bond market has also taken business away
from banks.   In the past, only Fortune 500 companies were
able to raise funds by selling their bonds directly to the pub-
lic, bypassing banks. Now, even lower quality corporate bor-
rowers can readily raise funds through access to the junk32 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JULY 1995
bond market. Despite predictions of the demise of the junk
bond market after the Michael Milken embarrassment, it is
clear that the junk bond market is here to stay. Although
sales of new junk bonds slid to $2.9 billion by 1990, they
rebounded to $16.9 billion in 1991, $42 billion in 1992,
and $60 billion in 1993.
The ability to securitize assets has made nonbank
ﬁnancial institutions even more formidable competitors for
banks. Advances in information and data processing tech-
nology have enabled nonbank competitors to originate
loans, transform these into marketable securities, and sell
them to obtain more funding with which to make more
loans. Computer technology has eroded the competitive
advantage of banks by lowering transactions costs and
enabling nonbank ﬁnancial institutions to evaluate credit
risk efﬁciently through the use of statistical methods.
When credit risk can be evaluated using statistical tech-
niques, as in the case of consumer and mortgage lending,
banks no longer have an advantage in making loans.4 An
effort is being made in the United States to develop a mar-
ket for securitized small business loans as well.
U.S. banks have also been beset by increased for-
eign competition, particularly from Japanese and European
banks. The success of the Japanese economy and Japan’s
high savings rate gave Japanese banks access to cheaper
funds than were available to American banks. This cost
advantage permitted Japanese banks to seek out loan busi-
ness in the United States more aggressively, eroding U.S.
banks’ market share. In addition, banks from all major
countries followed their corporate customers to the United
States and often enjoyed a competitive advantage because
of less burdensome regulation in their own countries.
Before 1980, two U.S. banks, Citicorp and BankAmerica
Corporation, were the largest banks in the world. In the
1990s, neither of these banks ranks among the top twenty.
Although some of this loss in market share may be due to
the depreciation of the dollar, most of it is not.
Similar forces are working to undermine the tradi-
tional role of banks in other countries. The U.S. banks are
not alone in losing their monopoly power over depositors.
Financial innovation and deregulation are occurring world-
wide and have created attractive alternatives for both depos-
itors and borrowers. In Japan, for example, deregulation has
opened a wide array of new ﬁnancial instruments to the
public, causing a disintermediation process similar to the
one that has taken place in the United States. In European
countries, innovations have steadily eroded the barriers that
have traditionally protected banks from competition.
In other countries, banks have also faced increased
competition from the expansion of securities markets.
Both ﬁnancial deregulation and fundamental economic
forces abroad have improved the availability of information
in securities markets, making it easier and less costly for
business ﬁrms to ﬁnance their activities by issuing securi-
ties rather than going to banks. Further, even in countries
where securities markets have not grown, banks have still
lost loan business because their best corporate customers
have had increasing access to foreign and offshore capital
markets such as the Eurobond market. In smaller econo-
mies, such as Australia, which still do not have well-
developed corporate bond or commercial paper markets,
banks have lost loan business to international securities
markets. In addition, the same forces that drove the securi-
tization process in the United States are at work in other
countries and will undercut the proﬁtability of traditional
banking there. Thus, although the decline of traditional
banking has occurred earlier in the United States than in
other countries, we can expect a diminished role for tradi-
tional banking in these countries as well.
HOW HAVE BANKS RESPONDED?
In any industry, a decline in proﬁtability usually results in
exit from the industry (often by widespread bankruptcies)
and a shrinkage of market share. This occurred in the
U.S. banks are not alone in losing their
monopoly power over depositors. Financial
innovation and deregulation are occurring
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banking industry in the United States during the l980s
through consolidations and bank failures. From 1960 to
1980, bank failures in the United States averaged less than
ten per year, but during the l980s, bank failures soared, ris-
ing to more than 200 a year in the late l980s (Chart 7).
To survive and maintain adequate proﬁt levels,
many U.S. banks are facing two alternatives. First, they can
attempt to maintain their traditional lending activity by
expanding into new, riskier areas of lending. For example,
U.S. banks have increased their risk taking by placing a
greater percentage of their total funds in commercial real
estate loans, traditionally a riskier type of loan (Chart 8). In
addition, they have increased lending for corporate take-
overs and leveraged buyouts, which are highly leveraged
transactions. There is evidence that banks have in fact
increased their lending to less creditworthy borrowers.
During the l980s, banks’ loan loss provisions relative to
assets climbed substantially, reaching a peak of 1.25 per-
To survive and maintain adequate proﬁt levels,
many U.S. banks are facing two alternatives.
First, they can attempt to maintain their
traditional lending activity by expanding into
new, riskier areas of lending. . . . [Second, they
can] pursue new, off-balance-sheet activities
that are more proﬁtable.
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cent in 1987. Only with the strong economy in 1994 have
loan loss provisions fallen to levels found in the worst years
of the 1970s (Chart 9). Recent evidence suggests that large
banks have taken even more risk than have smaller banks:
large banks have suffered the largest loan losses (Boyd and
Gertler 1993). Thus, banks appear to have maintained
their proﬁtability (and their net interest margins—interest
income minus interest expense divided by total assets) by
taking greater risk (Chart 10).5 Using stock market mea-
sures of risk, Demsetz and Strahan (1995) also ﬁnd that
before 1991 large bank holding companies took on more
systematic risk than smaller bank holding companies.
 The second way banks have sought to maintain
former proﬁt levels is to pursue new, off-balance-sheet
activities that are more proﬁtable. As Chart 4 shows, U.S.
commercial banks did this during the early 1980s, dou-
bling the share of their income coming from off-balance-
sheet, noninterest-income activities.6 This strategy, how-
ever, has generated concerns about what activities are
proper for banks and whether nontraditional activities
might be riskier and result in banks’ taking excessive risk.
Although banks have increased fee-based activities, the
area of expanding activities in nontraditional banking that
has raised the greatest concern is banks’ derivatives activi-
ties. Great controversy surrounds the issue of whether
banks should be permitted to engage in unlimited deriva-
tives activities, including serving as off-exchange or over-
the-counter (OTC) derivatives dealers. Some feel that such
activities are riskier than traditional banking and could
threaten the stability of the entire banking system. (We
discuss this issue more fully later in the paper.)
The United States is not the only country to expe-
rience increased risk taking by banks. Large losses and
bank failures have occurred in other countries. Banks in
Norway, Sweden, and Finland responded to deregulation
by dramatically increasing their real estate lending, a move
followed by a boom and bust in real estate sectors that
resulted in the insolvency of many large banking institu-
tions. Indeed, banks’ loan losses in these countries as a frac-
tion of GNP exceeded losses in both the banking and the
savings and loans industries in the United States. The
International Monetary Fund (1993) reports that govern-
ment (or taxpayer) support to shore up the banking system
in Scandinavian countries is estimated to range from 2.8 to
4.0 percent of GDP. This support is comparable to the sav-
ings and loan bailout in the United States, which
amounted to 3.2 percent of GDP.
Japanese banks have also suffered large losses from
riskier lending, particularly to the real estate sector. The
collapse of real estate values in Japan left many banks with
huge losses. Ministry of Finance estimates in June 1995
indicated that Japanese banks were holding 40 trillion yen
($470 billion) of nonperforming loans—loans on which
interest payments had not been made for more than six
months—but many private analysts think that the actual
amount of nonperforming loans may be substantially
larger.
Much of the controversy surrounding banks’
efforts to diversify into off-balance-sheet
activities has centered on the increasing role
of banks in derivatives markets.
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French and British banks suffered from the
worldwide collapse of real estate prices and from major
failures of risky real estate projects funded by banks.
Olympia and York’s collapse is a prominent example. The
loan-loss provisions of British and French banks, like
those of U.S. banks, have risen in the l990s. One result
has been the massive bailout of Credit Lyonnais by the
French government in March 1995. Even in countries
with healthy banking systems, such as Switzerland and
Germany, some banks have run into trouble. Regional
banks in Switzerland failed, and Germany’s BfG Bank
suffered huge losses (DM 1.1 billion) in l992 and needed
a capital infusion from its parent company, Credit Lyon-
nais. Thus, fundamental forces not limited to the United
States have caused a decline in the proﬁtability of tradi-
tional banking throughout the world and have created an




Much of the controversy surrounding banks’ efforts to
diversify into off-balance-sheet activities has centered on
the increasing role of banks in derivatives markets. Large
banks, in particular, have moved aggressively to become
worldwide dealers in off-exchange or OTC derivatives,
such as swaps.7 Their motivation, clearly, has been to
replace some of their lost “banking” revenue with the
attractive returns that can be earned in derivatives markets.
Banks have increased their participation in deriv-
atives markets dramatically in the last few years. In l994,
U.S. banks held derivatives contracts totaling more than
$16 trillion in notional value.8 Of these contracts, 63 per-
cent were interest rate derivatives, 35 percent were foreign
exchange derivatives, and the remainder were equity and
commodity derivatives.9   In addition, most of these deriv-
atives were held by large banks, and were held primarily
to facilitate the banks’ dealer and trading operations
(Table 2).10 In l994, the seven largest U.S.-bank deriva-
tives dealers accounted for more than 90 percent of the
notional value of all derivatives contracts held by U.S.
banks (Table 3).11 The proﬁtability of derivatives activities
has clearly encouraged banks to step up their involvement:
in 1994, derivatives accounted for between 15 and 65 per-
cent of the total trading income of four of the largest bank
dealers (Table 4).12
The increased participation of banks in derivatives
markets has been a concern to both regulators and legisla-
tors because they fear that derivatives may enable banks to
take more risk than is prudent. There can be little doubt
that derivatives can be used to increase risk substantially,
Sources:  Annual reports for 1994.
Table 3
NOTIONAL/CONTRACT DERIVATIVES AMOUNTS OF FIFTEEN
MAJOR U.S. OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES DEALERS
Millions of Dollars
Banks
Chemical Banking Corporation 3,177,600
Citicorp 2,664,600
J.P. Morgan & Co., Inc. 2,472,500
Bankers Trust New York Corporation 2,025,736
BankAmerica Corporation 1,400,707
The Chase Manhattan Corporation 1,360,000
First Chicago Corporation 622,100
Securities ﬁrms
Salomon, Inc. 1,509,000
Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. 1,326,000
Lehman Brothers, Inc. 1,143,091
The Goldman Sachs Group, L.P. 995,275
Morgan Stanley Group, Inc. 843,000
Insurance companies
American International Group, Inc. 376,869
General Re Corporation 306,159
The Prudential Insurance Co. of America 102,102
Total 17,852,239
Sources:  Annual reports for 1994.
a Totals, expressed in billions of dollars, appear in columns 1, 3, and 5. Averages,
















BankAmerica 1,333 95 68 5 1,401
Bank One 0 0 45 100 45
Bankers Trust 1,982 98 44 2 2,026
Chase 1,293 95 67 5 1,360
Chemical 3,069 97 109 3 3,178
Citicorp 2,449 92 216 8 2,665
J.P. Morgan 2,180 88 292 12 2,472
NationsBank 485 95 26 5 511
Total/averagea 12,791 94 867 6 13,65836 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JULY 1995
and can potentially be quite dangerous.13 In the last year,
many banks sustained substantial losses on interest rate
derivatives instruments when interest rates continued to
rise. Because of the leverage that is possible, derivatives
enable banks to place sizable “bets” on interest rate and
currency movements, which—if wrong—can result in siz-
able losses. In addition, as dealers in OTC derivatives mar-
kets, banks may be exposed to substantial counterparty
credit risk. Unlike organized futures exchanges, the OTC
market offers no clearinghouse guarantee to mitigate the
credit risk involved in derivatives trading. Finally, because
derivatives are often complex instruments, sophisticated
risk-control systems may be necessary to measure and track
a bank’s potential exposure. Questions have been raised
about whether banks are currently capable of managing
these risks.
Concern about the growing participation of banks
in derivatives markets is exempliﬁed by the remarks of
Representative Henry Gonzalez, Chairman of the Banking
Committee of the House of Representatives:
I have long believed that growing bank
involvement in derivative products is, as I say and
repeat, like a tinderbox waiting to explode. In the
case of many market innovations, regulation lags
behind until the crisis comes, as it has happened
in our case with S&L’s and banks. . . .
We must work to avoid a crisis related to
derivative products before, once again, . . . the tax-
payer is left holding the bag.14
In May 1994, Representative Gonzalez and Repre-
sentative Jim Leach introduced the Derivatives Safety and
Soundness Act of l994. This bill directs the federal bank-
ing agencies to establish common principles and standards
for capital, accounting, disclosure, and examination of
ﬁnancial institutions using derivatives. In addition, the bill
requires the Federal Reserve and the U.S. Comptroller of
the Currency to work with other central banks to develop
comparable international supervisory standards for ﬁnan-
cial institutions using derivatives. In discussing the need
for derivatives legislation, Representative Leach said, “one
of the ironies of the development of [derivatives markets] is
that while [individual ﬁrm] risk can be reduced . . . sys-
tematic risk can be increased.” A second problem, Leach
noted, is that in many cases derivatives instruments “are
too sophisticated for ﬁnancial managers.”15A further indi-
cation of these concerns is the plethora of recent studies
that have examined the activities of ﬁnancial institutions in
derivatives markets. Studies have been conducted by the
Bank for International Settlements (the “Promisel
Report”), the Bank of England, the Group of Thirty, the
Ofﬁce of the U.S. Comptroller of the Currency, the Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission, and, most recently,
the U.S. Government Accounting Ofﬁce (GAO).
The GAO released its report, “Financial Deriva-
tives: Actions Needed to Protect the Financial System,” in
May 1994. The report concluded that there is some reason
to believe that derivatives do pose a threat to ﬁnancial sta-
bility. It raises the prospect that a default by a major OTC
derivatives dealer—and in particular by a major bank—
could result in spillover effects that could “close down”
OTC derivatives markets, with potentially serious ramiﬁ-
cations for the entire ﬁnancial system. The GAO recom-
mends that a number of measures be taken to strengthen
government regulation and supervision of all participants
in OTC derivatives markets, including banks.
The fear of a major bank failure because of OTC
derivatives activities appears to stem from two sources.
First, the sheer size of banks’ OTC derivatives activities
suggests that they may be exposed to substantial market
and credit risk because of their derivatives positions. In
particular, there is concern that as OTC derivatives deal-
Sources:  Company annual reports.
a Totals, expressed in millions of dollars, appear in columns 1 and 3. Averages,
expressed as percentages, appear in columns 2 and 4.
Table 4






Chase 108 15 201 28
Chemical 391 61 453 42
Citicorp 400 29 800 27
J.P. Morgan 663 65 797 39
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ers, banks may be exposed to sizable counterparty credit
risk. This concern has been heightened in recent months
by the near-bankruptcy of Metallgesellschaft, Germany’s
fourteenth largest ﬁrm and a major end-user and counter-
party in the swap market. Second, many fear that regula-
tion, as well as managerial sophistication, has lagged
developments in the derivatives area, and as a conse-
quence, banks may be taking more risk than is prudent
(and more than they even realize).
HOW RISKY ARE BANKS’ OTC DERIVATIVES
ACTIVITIES?
Much of the concern about banks’ activities in derivatives
markets has centered on their central position as major
dealers in the swap market. At year-end l994, the notional
value of all swap contracts outstanding was $7.1 trillion
(Table 5).16 Interest rate swaps represented 82 percent of
this amount, with currency swaps making up most of the
remaining contracts (Table 6). Although detailed informa-
tion about the nature of these swap agreements is not avail-
able, the bulk of them are probably “plain vanilla” swaps—
an exchange of ﬁxed for ﬂoating rates. As such, these con-
tracts are similar to “strips” of forward or futures contracts
(for example, Eurodollar futures strips). Swaps are attrac-
tive to end-users because of their customized nature, low
cost, and longer maturities.
As major dealers in the swap market, banks have
extensive counterparty obligations and may be exposed to
Sources: Bank for International Settlements; U.S. Government Accounting Ofﬁce; International Swaps and Derivatives Association; Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
a Estimates for foreign exchange forward contracts are from U.S. Government Accounting Ofﬁce 1994 (GAO report), Table  IV.5. These also include an unknown amount of
over-the-counter foreign exchange options.
b Does not include complete data on physical commodity derivatives and equity options on the common stock of individual companies. Table IV.2 of the GAO report shows
that seven of the databases contain equity and commodity derivatives that ranged from 1.1 to 3.4 percent of total derivatives’ notional/contract amounts.
c Before including GAO estimates for foreign exchange forwards and over-the-counter options.
Table 5
NOTIONAL/CONTRACT AMOUNTS FOR DERIVATIVES WORLDWIDE BY INDIVIDUAL PRODUCT TYPE













from 1990 to 1993
Forwards
Forward rate agreements 1,156 1,533 1,807 2,522
Foreign exchange forwardsa 3,277 4,531 5,510 6,232
Total forwards 4,433 6,064 7,317 8,754 35 97
Futures
Interest rate futures 1,454 2,157 2,902 4,960
Currency futures 16 18 25 30
Equity index futures 70 77 81 119
Total futures 1,540 2,252 3,008 5,109 20 231
Options
Exchange-traded interest rate options 600 1,073 1,385 2,362
Over-the-counter interest rate options 561 577 634 1,398
Exchange-traded cutrency options 56 61 80 81
Exchange-traded equity index options 96 137 168 286
Total options 1,313 1,848 2,267 4,127 17 214
Swaps
Interest rate swaps 2,312 3,065 3,851 6,177
Currency swaps 578 807 860 900
Total swaps 2,890 3,872 4,711 7,077 28 145
Total derivativesb 10,176 14,036 17,303 25,067 100 146
Total derivativesc 6,899 9,505 11,893 18,83538 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JULY 1995
substantial market and counterparty credit risk. The
notional or principal amount of the swap contracts that
banks hold, however, is not a good measure of the magni-
tude of their credit exposure. Unlike credit instruments
such as loans and bonds, swaps and other derivatives trans-
actions do not involve payments of principal amounts.
Derivatives contracts require periodic payments based on
notional amounts but not payments of the notional
amounts themselves. For example, a swap of a variable
interest rate for a 7 percent ﬁxed rate on a $10 million
principal (notional) amount commits the swap parties to
annual payments to each other on the order of $700,000,
with differences in future payments depending on how
interest rates move in the future. A party’s credit exposure,
therefore, is not the notional value of the contract, as it is
for a loan, but the “replacement cost” of the contract.17
Thus, the typical derivatives transaction involves a credit
exposure that is only a fraction of its notional principal.
The GAO report closely examined fourteen major
OTC derivatives dealers. Together, these dealers held
derivative contracts with a notional principal of $6.5 tril-
lion as of year-end l992. The “gross” credit exposure (or
replacement cost) on these derivatives, however, was far
less. The GAO estimated the replacement cost to be only
$114 billion, or about 1.8 percent of the dealers’ $6.5 tril-
lion of notional outstandings.18
In addition, this ﬁgure does not take into account
the various risk-management mechanisms that banks use
to limit counterparty exposure. Bilateral contractual net-
ting provisions, which allow banks to offset losses with
gains from other contracts outstanding with a defaulting
party and its corporate afﬁliates, are common. Moreover,
when swaps are undertaken with lower quality parties,
such counterparties are usually required to post collateral
on a mark-to-market basis. After taking these risk-reducing
mechanisms into account, the GAO report estimated the
“net” credit exposure of the fourteen dealers to be only
$68 billion, or about 1 percent of the notional value of
their outstanding derivatives contracts.
This credit exposure is managed by banks in a
variety of ways. Internal credit limits are commonly used
to diversify credit risk and to restrict the size of exposures
to individual counterparties, industries, and countries.
Most counterparties in swap transactions are required to
have investment grade ratings,19 and credit “triggers” fre-
quently require the automatic termination of a swap agree-
ment if the credit rating of either party falls below a
prespeciﬁed threshold (such as a single A rating).
To put banks’ derivatives credit exposures in per-
spective, the derivatives exposures of bank derivatives deal-
ers can be compared with credit exposures that the same
banks face as a consequence of their loan portfolios.20 For
the seven largest U.S.-bank derivatives dealers, derivatives-
related gross credit exposures as a percentage of bank
equity were generally less than a fourth of their loan expo- Source: International Swaps and Derivatives Association.
Table 6
NOTIONAL PRINCIPAL OF INTEREST RATE AND CURRENCY
SWAPS WRITTEN ANNUALLY BY UNDERLYING AND
OUTSTANDING
Billions of U.S. Dollars
Type of Swap 1987 1990 1991 1992 1993
Interest rate swaps
U.S. dollar 287 676 926 1,336 1,546
Deutsche mark 22 106 103 237 399
Yen 32 137 194 428 789
Others 47 345 397 821 1,370
Subtotal 388 1,264 1,622 2,822 4,104
Currency swaps
Dollar 38 65 122 106 109
Nondollar 48 148 206 196 186
Subtotal 86 213 328 302 295
Total swaps written 474 1,477 1,950 2,124 4,399
Total swaps outstanding
(at year-end) 867 2,890 3,872 4,711 7,077
Properly measured, therefore, banks’ credit-risk
exposures associated with their OTC derivatives
activities do not seem out of proportion to their
other credit exposures, such as the exposure they
have to defaults on their loan portfolio.FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JULY 1995 39
sures (Chart 11). Only Bankers Trust New York Corpora-
tion, which is probably the most active bank in derivatives
markets, and J.P. Morgan had a gross derivatives credit
exposure far in excess of their loan exposure. Although it is
true that banks’ credit exposure to derivatives is substan-
tial—it exceeds 100 percent of the equity of all of the sur-
veyed banks—a bank’s capital would be wiped out by
derivatives losses only if all counterparties were to default,
there were no offsetting netting agreements or other risk-
reduction mechanisms in force, and actual counterparty
losses were identical to total credit exposures. Such
assumptions are extreme, for loan defaults as well as for
derivatives-related exposures.
Properly measured, therefore, banks’ credit-risk
exposures associated with their OTC derivatives activities
do not seem out of proportion to their other credit expo-
sures, such as the exposure they have to defaults on their
loan portfolio. Banks also appear to be managing these
derivatives-related exposures reasonably well. Indeed, the
GAO reported that actual losses incurred by derivatives
dealers as a result of counterparty defaults have been quite
small: 0.2 percent of their combined gross credit exposure.21
Finally, derivatives activities can clearly be used by
banks to increase their exposure to changes in interest rates
and exchange rates—that is, to increase their market risk.
This kind of risk, however, is hardly new to banks. Banks
have always been exposed to such risks because of their
holdings of ﬁxed-rate, long-term loans and securities, and
because of their foreign operations and foreign currency
positions. Derivatives can be used either to increase or
decrease these risks. Consequently, like all other transac-
tions that pose market risk, derivatives contracts must be
managed prudently.
REGULATION OF BANKS’ DERIVATIVES
ACTIVITIES
There has also been concern that banks may be taking
excessive risk in their derivatives activities.22 Indeed, the
GAO report suggests that there may be an intrinsic regu-
latory problem associated with banks’ dealing in OTC
derivatives:
The regulation of banks is essential, because
they have deposit insurance and direct access to
the Federal Reserve’s discount window. At the
same time, however, this combination of deposit
insurance and access also can result in potential
problems because it may induce the banks and
their customers to inappropriately rely on such
backing. Therefore, banks may be willing to run
greater risks in their trading activities—in rela-
tion to their capital—than otherwise would be the
case. In addition, market participants may prefer
using banks for derivatives and related trading
activities simply because banks are perceived to be
safer counterparties. In the past, similar concerns
caused us to recommend that nontraditional bank-
ing activities, such as those associated with under-
writing and dealing in corporate debt and equity
securities, be conducted only by well-managed
and well-capitalized banks in separate subsidiaries
of the bank holding company. Whether deriva-
tives should be placed in this category depends on
regulators’ determinations on how they are being
used by individual banks.23
An important question, therefore, is whether
banks’ derivatives activities are so different from other
bank activities that they cannot be effectively regulated. Is
there something special about derivatives that makes pru-
Chart 11
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dential regulation to protect the federal deposit insurance
fund and taxpayers more difﬁcult or even impossible? A
key issue is whether bank capital requirements, the central
component of prudential regulation, can be successfully
applied to banks’ derivatives activities. If not, there may be
an argument for either prohibiting derivatives activities (or
possibly dealer activities) or segregating them into sepa-
rately capitalized bank afﬁliates.24
Banks’ derivatives activities are already subject to
extensive prudential regulation. Both U.S. and Basle
Accord capital requirements apply to U.S. banks’ deriva-
tives activities. U.S. banks are required to comply with two
different types of capital requirements—a risk-based
requirement and a leverage ratio requirement. The risk-
based requirement applies to the credit risk associated with
derivatives contracts or activities. The leverage ratio
requires banks to hold capital as a cushion against losses
arising from other risks associated with derivatives posi-
tions, such as operations risk. Not surprisingly, there is
considerable controversy about whether these capital
requirements are too low or too high.
The more important question, however, is whether
any capital requirements on derivatives activities can suc-
cessfully control banks’ risk taking. Some argue that deriv-
atives are so complex and so nontransparent that it is
difﬁcult for regulators to devise capital regulations to con-
trol banks’ risk taking (or, for that matter, for the market
to monitor banks’ derivatives activities).
We are skeptical about this view. Although some
derivatives instruments are undoubtedly complex, expo-
sure to derivatives risk does not seem much different from
exposure to many other bank activities, such as credit risk
in a loan portfolio or interest rate risk in a variety of ﬁxed-
income securities. Banks can achieve high leverage in a
number of ways other than through derivatives and can
quickly change (or increase) their risk exposure in many
different ways. While it is not clear how much capital
should be required for a given derivatives risk exposure,
these implementation problems are not unique to deriva-
tives activities. All new bank activities are likely to present
similar problems.
Thus, banks’ recent push into derivatives activities
raises all of the questions commonly raised when banks
engage in new off-balance-sheet activities. Are these activi-
ties too risky for banks? Do banks have the managerial
capacity to engage in these activities in a safe way? Can
these activities be effectively regulated? The challenges
posed by these questions are no different for derivatives
than they are for other banking activities.
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY
The decline of traditional banking presents a challenge to
regulators and policymakers. On the one hand, banks may
respond to their shrinking intermediary role and dimin-
ished proﬁtability by taking greater risk, which, if
unchecked, could undermine the stability of the banking
system. There is some evidence that banks have in fact
increased their risk taking, either by pursuing riskier strat-
egies in their traditional business lines or by seeking out
new and riskier activities. On the other hand, long-run
ﬁnancial stability would beneﬁt from a restructuring of the
banking industry that strengthens the competitive posi-
tion of banks. Achieving this goal may require eliminating
unnecessary (nonprudential) regulations and permitting
banks to enter new markets and to engage in new activities.
One approach to achieving these dual objectives is
to couple adequate capital requirements for banks with
early corrective action by regulators to prevent capital from
falling below speciﬁed levels.25 Requiring banks to hold
adequate capital promotes ﬁnancial stability in two ways.
First, it provides a greater cushion with which banks can
absorb losses, lessening the likelihood of failure. Second,
with more capital at risk, banks have less incentive to take
excessive risk—they have more to lose if their bets go
wrong. To ensure that banks hold the requisite amount of
capital and do not engage in either excessively risky or ille-
gal activities, supervision and ﬁeld examinations of banks
would continue to be necessary.26Requiring early corrective
action by regulators to recapitalize a bank that has suffered
an erosion in its capital promotes stability in three ways.
First, it provides predictability for banks and bank share-
holders. Certain regulatory actions predictably follow cer-
tain economic events. Second, it prevents a bank’s capital
from falling to levels that threaten losses to the bank insur-FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JULY 1995 41
ance fund. In addition, by requiring banks to maintain a
positive net worth, it mitigates the moral hazard prob-
lem—banks will have something to lose by taking excessive
risk. Lastly, early corrective action mitigates the regulatory
forbearance problem by preventing regulators from using
their discretion about whether or not to take action.27
A beneﬁt of this regulatory strategy is that regu-
lation need no longer restrict banks’ activities. As long as
banks must hold sufﬁcient capital against whatever activ-
ities they engage in, taxpayers will be protected and
banks will have an incentive to avoid excessive risk tak-
ing. Further, freedom to offer additional products and
services will better enable banks to compete with non-
bank competitors and with foreign banks, and will make
banks less susceptible to failure because they will be bet-
ter diversiﬁed. (An example of such diversiﬁcation bene-
ﬁts is casualty insurance, where losses are due principally
to acts of god and have a very low correlation with the
losses that banks typically incur, which are due primarily
to adverse economic events.)
A key component of this approach is that bank
risk exposures need to be measured accurately and capital
requirements be set high enough to deter excessive risk
taking. This requires, among other things, the adoption of
market-value accounting principles for valuing bank assets
and liabilities. Historical-cost accounting principles do not
ensure that changes in the economic value of a bank’s assets
and liabilities will be reﬂected in its true net worth. It is
the market value of a bank’s assets and liabilities, together
with the market value of its equity capital, that determines
a bank’s economic solvency. Further, the market value of a
bank’s net worth is what the bank risks when it takes addi-
tional risk.
Objections to market-value-based capital require-
ments center on the difﬁculty of making accurate market-
value estimates of assets and liabilities. Historical-cost
accounting has an important advantage in that it is easier
to value assets and liabilities. Market-value accounting, in
contrast, requires estimates and approximations that are
harder to justify and are often more expensive to obtain.
Despite these difﬁculties, market-value accounting may
still be able to provide a more accurate picture of a bank’s
economic condition. Clearly, an important research topic
for regulatory authorities is the feasibility of applying mar-
ket-value accounting principles to banking institutions.
Adoption of market-value accounting would have
the additional advantage of making a bank’s condition more
transparent and therefore making regulators and politicians
more accountable. Regulators and politicians are subject to
a principal-agent problem: they often have an incentive to
hide potential problems, even though taxpayers would be
better off if these problems were dealt with sooner rather
than later (or not at all). Market-value accounting would
make it easier for taxpayers to monitor the actions of regu-
lators and politicians, and would make it more difﬁcult for
regulators to engage in policies of forbearance.
Another important component of a regulatory
strategy to maintain bank soundness is supervisory moni-
toring. Regulation must be able to keep banks from chang-
ing their risk exposure after capital requirements are
determined. Both this element of regulatory supervision
and the need for early intervention have increased in
importance of late because of the emergence of derivatives
markets that make it easier for banks to quickly take large
bets on interest rate and other asset price movements. As
we have learned from the recent collapse of Barings, regu-
lators must also ensure that adequate internal controls are
in place with regard to asset quality and risk management
procedures.
Public disclosure of banks’ risk exposures would
increase market efﬁciency and bolster market
discipline. Banks should provide a meaningful
depiction of the risks associated with their
trading activities, both in derivatives and in
on-balance-sheet securities, and of their ability
to manage these risks.42 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JULY 1995
Finally, public disclosure of banks’ risk exposures
would increase market efﬁciency and bolster market disci-
pline. Banks should provide a meaningful depiction of the
risks associated with their trading activities, both in deriv-
atives and in on-balance-sheet securities, and of their abil-
ity to manage these risks. More public information about
the risks incurred by banks will better enable stockholders,
creditors, and depositors to evaluate and monitor banks,
and will act as a deterrent to excessive risk taking. This
view is consistent with a recent discussion paper issued by
the Euro-currency Standing Committee of the G-10 Cen-
tral Banks (1994), which goes so far as to recommend that
estimates of ﬁnancial risk generated by ﬁrms’ own internal
risk management systems be adapted for public disclosure
purposes.28 Such information would supplement disclo-
sures based on traditional accounting conventions by pro-
viding information about risk exposures and risk
management that is not normally included in conventional
balance sheet and income-statement reports.
CONCLUSION
The decline of traditional banking entails a risk to the
ﬁnancial system only if regulators fail to adapt their pol-
icies to the new ﬁnancial environment that is emerging.
A constructive regulatory approach is to adopt a system
of structured bank capital requirements together with
early corrective action by regulators. An important ele-
ment of this system is the adoption of market-value
accounting principles for all ﬁnancial institutions. In
addition, supervisory monitoring and greater public dis-
closure by all ﬁnancial institutions of the risks associated
with their trading activities would be beneﬁcial. Lastly,
to enhance the competitiveness and efﬁciency of ﬁnan-
cial markets, banks could be permitted to engage in a
diversiﬁed array of both bank and nonbank products and
services. This general regulatory strategy, we believe,
can successfully keep in check excessive risk taking by
banks while providing the ﬂexibility for both banks and
regulators to restructure the banking system to achieve
greater long-term stability. Finally, we do not view
banks’ off-balance-sheet activities, including their deriv-
atives activities, as a threat to ﬁnancial stability. Prop-
erly used and regulated, derivatives can facilitate the
management of risk and increase the long-term viability
of banks and the ﬁnancial system.ENDNOTES
NOTES FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JULY 1995 43
1. Franklin R. Edwards is Arthur Burns Professor of Finance and
Economics at the Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, and
Visiting Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. Frederic S.
Mishkin is Executive Vice President and Director of Research at the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Research Associate at the National
Bureau of Economic Research, and A. Barton Hepburn Professor of
Finance and Economics at the Graduate School of Business, Columbia
University. An earlier version of this article appeared in Spanish in the
June 1995 issue of Moneda y Credito as a part of the proceedings of the
Symposium on Financial Instability. The research is part of the National
Bureau of Economic Research’s programs in Monetary Economics and
Economic Fluctuations. Any opinions expressed are those of the authors
and not those of Columbia University, the National Bureau of Economic
Research, the American Enterprise Institute, the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, or the Federal Reserve System.
The authors thank Arturo Estrella, Charles Goodhart, Stavros
Peristiani, Eli Remolona, Philip Strahan, and Betsy White for their
comments and William Bassett for research assistance. Discussants at the
Symposium on Financial Instability and participants in a workshop at the
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2. Although many banks may be able to maintain their relative position
as financial intermediaries by engaging in nontraditional banking
activities, for policy purposes it is important to focus on the economic
forces that have undercut the role of banking. Indeed, an important
question is whether substantive public policy issues are raised by banks
having to transform themselves into financial intermediaries that look
more like nonbank financial intermediaries.
3. See also Edwards (l993).
4. Banks have also been engaged in the securitization process and, with
the advent of higher bank capital requirements, have had greater
incentives to move loans off balance sheet by securitizing them. Banks’
involvement in the securitization process has been another contributing
factor to the growth in their off-balance-sheet activities. Nevertheless,
the basic point still stands: computer technology that can be used by
nonbanking institutions to securitize assets has diminished the banks’
competitive position.
5. U.S. banks have an incentive to take additional risk because of federal
deposit insurance. Insured depositors have little incentive to monitor
banks and to penalize them for taking too much risk. This moral hazard
problem was compounded by our de facto “too-big-to-fail” policy for
large banks. Although the 1991 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act (FDICIA) has a least-cost resolution provision that
makes it harder to bail out large depositors, there is an exception to the
provision whereby a bank would be in effect declared too big to fail so
that all depositors would be fully protected if a two-thirds majority of
both the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the
Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as well as the
secretary of the Treasury agreed. Thus, the moral hazard problem created
by the too-big-to-fail policy has been reduced but not entirely eliminated
by the 1991 FDICIA legislation.
6. Note that some off-balance-sheet activities that produce fee income,
such as loan commitments and letters of credit, can be classified as
traditional banking business. The data in Chart 4 overstate somewhat
nontraditional banking business.
7. As of the third quarter, l993, all insured commercial banks held
interest rate swaps contracts with a notional value of $2.79 trillion. See
Bank Administration Institute and McKinsey & Company, Inc. (1994,
p. 5).
8. Federal Reserve call report (RC-L) data for U.S. banks for the first
quarter of l992. See also U.S. General Accounting Office (1994, p. 182).
9. U.S. General Accounting Office (1994).
10. Salomon Brothers (1994, p. 8). Qualitative statements in the banks’
annual reports suggest that much of their derivatives trading is
customer-driven.
11. U.S. General Accounting Office (1994, p. 188, Appendix V, and
p. l82, Appendix IV).
12. Salomon Brothers (1994, p. 9, Chart 5).
13. See Franklin R. Edwards (1994).
14. Remarks made on the floor of the House of Representatives,
Congressional Record, June l8, l993, H 3322.
15. Mark Kollar (1994, p. 1, col. 2).
16. This amount includes interest rate and currency swaps plus caps,
floors, collars, and swaptions outstanding. Equity, commodity, and
multi-asset derivatives are not included. The latter totaled $131 billion
at year-end l992, relative to a total of $4.7 trillion of swap contracts at
year-end 1992. See Group of Thirty (1993, p. 58).
17. Measured at any point in time, credit risk exists only for
counterparties with profitable positions. A losing counterparty has no
credit risk. For example, assume that under an interest rate swap
agreement, a firm receives fixed-interest payments and pays floating44 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JULY 1995 NOTES
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rates. At the inception of this swap, the market value of the firm’s
position in the swap may be zero. If, subsequently, interest rates decline
substantially, the firm will receive more than it will pay, so the firm will
have a valuable or profitable position in the swap. This value, created by
the change in interest rates, is the firm’s replacement cost for the swap,
and represents the credit risk to which it is exposed. If its counterparty
defaults on future swap payments, the replacement cost is the cost to the
firm of replacing the swap on the same favorable terms.
18. These include both swaps and forward contracts.
19. U.S. General Accounting Office (1994, p. 59, Table 3.1).
20. U.S. General Accounting Office (1994, pp. 54-55).
21. U.S. General Accounting Office (1994, p. 55).
22. For a review of the current regulation of banks’ derivatives activities,
see U.S. General Accounting Office (1994, pp. 69-84).
23. U.S. General Accounting Office (1994, p. 125).
24. Alternatively, there may be an argument for some form of “narrow
banking,” where the deposit-taking function of the bank is separated
from other bank activities, such as derivatives activities.
25. This approach is discussed extensively in Benston and Kaufman
(1988), elements of which are in the 1991 FDICIA act.
26. As Gorton and Rosen (1994) point out, corporate control (agency)
issues may also contribute to excessive risk taking when traditional
banking business declines. Thus, steps to control this agency problem
may also be needed to control risk taking. What form these steps should
take requires additional research and is beyond the scope of this paper.
27. As capital declined below certain “trigger” levels, for example,
regulatory authorities would be required to take specific actions, such as
restricting the ability of the bank to expand and preventing the bank
from paying dividends and interest on subordinated debentures.
28. See also the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (1994), which is a
companion piece to the Euro-currency Standing Committee’s report.
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